CONTACT | SUBSCRIBE | ΝEWSLETTER - ΔΕΛΤΙΟ

• HELLENES ONLINE
• IDEAS & OPINION
• DEBATES @ PNYX
• TOPICS & ARTICLES
• INTERVENTIONS
• PEOPLE
• CALENDAR
• ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ

• Greece to Cut Government Jobs as Debt Pressure Intensifies
• Greek party leaders seek deal as bankruptcy looms

• Archives
• Log in

You are here: > The name issue of FYROM

Tuesday, February 7th, 2012 | Classifieds | ABOUT

The name issue of FYROM

A factor of instability and estrangement in the Balkans

A. Introduction

For the last ten years, Greece has been an important net-contributor, not consumer, of stability, security and development in the sensitive region of South Eastern Europe.

Greece consistently supports the European and Euro-Atlantic perspective of all countries in the region, with no exception whatsoever.

In the framework of multilateral and European Union initiatives, but also on a bilateral level, Greece contributed and continues to contribute decisively for the implementation of necessary reforms, democratization and the achievement of growth and development in South Eastern Europe.

The “Greek Plan for the Reconstruction of the Balkans” alone, when completed in 2011, will have helped attract to the area more than 550 million Euros of investments.

During the most crucial and sensitive period of transition for the economies of all states in the Balkans, Greek Business and Banks invested in the region close to 18 billion Euros, creating precious new employment (200 thousand new jobs). Remittances by foreign employees, citizens of many Balkan countries who found employment in Greece, amount to more than 800 million Euros per annum, contributing significantly to the revival of their home countries’ economies.

Given the above, it comes as no surprise that Greece is extremely sensitive and careful towards any possible danger that could put in jeopardy what has been already achieved or slacken the pace of progress.

Such a danger is undoubtedly the extreme nationalism and/or lack of respect for the fundamental principle of establishing good neighbourly relations with all states in the region.

B. Essence of the name issue

Apart from the above, the essence of the “name issue” over “Macedonia is very simple and crystal-clear: Macedonia is a geographical region which extends “beyond one sovereign territory”, that of Greece, FYROM, Bulgaria and Albania.

The problem arises because one country, FYROM, insists on monopolizing the name of this particular geographic region as the name of its own state and nation, although a) FYROM’S sovereignty extends only in part (35%) over this region and b) another state, Greece, which includes 55% of geographic Macedonia in its sovereign territory, uses the same name.�

Not surprisingly, this name constitutes the foremost element for the self definition of the Greek population (2.5 million) in Macedonia, yet with a completely different content than that in FYROM.

If the consolidation of a geographic name in International (or other) Law depends also on arguments coming from history, then the “name issue” of Macedonia between Greece and FYROM contains obvious elements of a paradox: most respected and objective scientific sources confirm that the etymology of the word “Macedonia” is Greek, that the ancient language of Macedonia was Greek and that the term “Macedonia” and all its derivatives are absolutely and continuously from antiquity up to this day connected to the cultural patrimony of Greece.

We have arrived at the historically absurd situation where FYROM not only demands to be recognized as “Macedonia”, but, in fact, as the only Macedonia; where its Slavic people not only demand to be some Slav-Macedonians, but, in fact, the only Macedonians.

From this perspective, the use of the name Macedonia by the Former Yugoslav Republic, without any further clarification or definition, is ~ totally misleading because it directs to the erroneous identification of millions of citizens of one state (Greece) with that of the citizens of a neighbouring state (FYROM), who have a totally different perception of themselves, their culture, their ethnic identity and language.

Further, FYROM cultivates the entirely wrong (and dangerous) perception that whatever refers, or has ties to “Macedonia”, from antiquity up to this date, is only connected to their fledging State.

C. Factor of instability and estrangement

Unfortunately, a disconcerting example of the above is provided by our northern neighbour, the Former Republic of Macedonia (FYROM): driven by an ever more inexplicable Slav-Macedonian nationalism, the political leadership of the country, systematically and by every means at its disposal, cultivates among its citizens (especially Slav Macedonians) the deceptive historical dogma, according to which Greece unjustly occupies the biggest and richest part of “their country”, “oppressing thousands” of their “Macedonian” brothers.

All textbooks, maps, scholastic literature and other aids are conveying to the student and adult citizen of FYROM a deep feeling of injustice and loss for “unredeemed” parts of their nation and state, which has been “unjustly divided and occupied” by its neighbours, especially Greece.

Hostile-irredentist feelings among Slav-Macedonian citizens against Greece and Greeks are the obvious and logical result of this state organized effort: evidence that these feelings exist is visible practically everywhere.

A climate of estrangement and conflict is bound to follow. First signs of the escalating tension are obvious to the bare eye.

One of the main vehicles for promoting the above historical dogma, is the insistence by the Slav-Macedonian leadership in Skopje to monopolize the name “Macedonia”, “Macedonian”, although 65% of the geographic region of Macedonia lies beyond the borders of present-day FYROM.

The combination of hostile and irredentist propaganda and the monopolization of the name constitute a potentially explosive factor of instability and lack of security in the region, a situation that Greece-and everyone else-cannot accept or ignore.

The above is ample proof that the recent renaming of the Skopje airport to “Alexander the Great” was neither a casual initiative, nor was it, of course, connected to the preposterous reasons put forward by the leadership in FYROM: it squarely falls in their well organized, hostile propaganda consistently pursued up to this day.�

It is more than obvious that a same-sounding term for two completely different cases, provokes only confusion at every level and in every sector (semantic, symbolic, geographic, ethnological, linguistic, etc.), with negative, dangerous and totally unnecessary consequences for all sides concerned.

D. Greece’s principled position and readiness

Greece wishes to defend the cultural, ethnic identity of its Macedonian citizens, yet also wants to prevent the irresponsible cultivation of an atmosphere of estrangement and conflict among different people in the sensitive region of South Eastern Europe.

Doing so, Greece does not deny the right of existence after 1944 of a neighbouring nation, a language and a republic; yet the latter has to adopt a name that will exactly define the geographic region over which its sovereignty actually extends and at the same time represent the ethnic (Slavic and Albanian) origin of its citizens.

In a demonstration of concrete good will and sense of compromise Greece has covered the greatest distance between the differing views on the subject. It is up to the other side to take the remaining few steps in order to achieve, sooner rather than later, a mutually acceptable solution.

No one should underestimate the sensitivity of the issue for the overwhelming majority of Greeks, especially Macedonians: it is only 60 years back when Tito’s Yugoslavia and his “People’s Republic of Macedonia”, with the help of Stalin, tried to accomplish the annexation of Greek Macedonia, by openly supporting a communist uprising in Greece, which resulted in a bitter, three-year civil war, that left deep scars.

E. Is the “name issue” merely a bilateral problem?

From this perspective, the “name issue” is not merely a bilateral, but a problem of distinct international proportions and consequences: after all, the UN are directly involved in finding a mutually acceptable solution, various other international institutions are indirectly engaged by describing the successful conclusion of arriving to a mutually acceptable solution as a prerequisite for FYROM’s integration and, last but not least, every third country adopting the one or the other side’s point on the name of FYROM, is actually taking a stand with direct international and multilateral implications.

Last but not least, preserving stability and security in the volatile region of South Eastern Europe is a responsibility that cannot be restricted to the mere efforts of Greece for a) convincing the authorities in FYROM to respect the basic principle of establishing good neighbourly relations with all and b) achieving a mutually acceptable solution to the “name issue” of FYROM.

Canadian Hellenic Congress

info@canadianhelleniccongress.com